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Vague rules are much maligned. This article argues that they should
be preferred over precise rules because they provide customized compli-
ance. Take the example of the recently liberalized speed limits on high-
ways. Does a state that chooses "reasonable speed" as its limit (such as
Montana1) provide more or less welfare for its residents than one that
adopts a precise limit (such as Florida's 75 mph)? Even if the vague limit
is interpreted on average as being equivalent to the precise, it allows those
who are in a hurry to drive faster than those who wish to economize gas.
Their different choices are the result of their different willingness to suffer
a penalty, since the one who is in a hurry may gladly take an even chance
at paying a fine if he values timely arrival at more than half the fine.2 If the
policy behind the speed limit is to induce a certain average speed--to in-
crease safety by means of a lower average speed,3 or for reasons of gas
* University of Connecticut, School of Law. Acknowledgments: Robert Bar4 Lofius Becker,
Phillip Blumberg, Reinier Kraakman, Thomas Micel, Steen Shrvel, Kathon Spler, Kurt Strasser
Stephen Utz, participants in the University of Connecticut Law School faculty colloquium, the Cmna-
dian Law and Economics annual meeting of 1997, and the American Law and Economics Association
annual meeting of 1999.
1. Notice, however, that Montana's "reasonable speed" limit was, however, struck down as un-
constitutionally vague. See State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132 (Mont. 1998). Montana now has a speed
limit of 75 mph on federal-aid interstate highways outside urbanized areas. &e MoNr. CODE ANN. §
61-8-303 (1999).
2. An example clarifies. Suppose that late arrival to work has the consequence of parking that is
more expensive by $20. Travel at 70 mph allows a commuter to arrive on time for the cheaper parking.
Half of the time, the route is monitored by troopers who consider speeds exceeding 60 mph to be un-
reasonable while the other half of the time the route is patrolled by troopers who deem speeds exceed-
ing 70 mph as unreasonable. An unreasonable speed attracts a S30 fine. Given this scenario, a com-
muter will choose to travel at 70 mph because the expected fine of paying $30 half the time translates
to $15 (0.5*$30), which is less than the cost of being late, $20.
3. It is important to note the difference between increasing safety by inducing a lower average
speed and increasing safety by means of inducing all drivers to drive at the same speed. A vague limit
will achieve the former but not the latter. The precision of speed limits may well bejustified by con-
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consumption or highway wear and tear-the vague limit is likely to reach
the given goal while providing greater total welfare than the precise limit.
Effectively, the vague limit allows the slow and the fast driver to unwit-
tingly come to an exchange on how to reach the social goal of maintaining
the desired average speed.
By contrast, a precise limit induces uniform conducts at the expense of
the customized compliance a vague limit can provide. Consider a car
overtaking another on the highway. Compare the difference between the
speeds of the two cars under two limits of different precision. Consider
first the difference between their speeds under a vague standard of "rea-
sonable speed" that is interpreted on average as a 75 mph limit. Compare
that difference in speeds with the difference their speeds would have if a
precise "75 mph" rule applied. The two cars' speeds will tend to be closer
to one another in the case of the precise limit. Thus, if the goal of the limit
is to induce safety by reducing discrepancies in speeds, the precise limit
achieves this goal better than the vague limit. Precision induces concen-
tration of conducts, conducts that differ less than they would under a
vaguer limit. We shall study here how precise each limit should be, fo-
cusing on the effect that choice of precision has on concentration of con-
ducts.
Examples where the choice of precision determines uniformity of con-
ducts abound. The disclosure of financial information of publicly traded
corporations follows narrowly defined rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.4 The precision of these rules makes corporate communica-
tion to the public investors uniform and easier to understand.5 Other ac-
tivities, however, are subject to vague standards.6 The most familiar may
be the negligence standard. Negligence law penalizes carelessness by
having those who breach a vague limit of "reasonable care" remedy the
cerns that travel on the same road at very different speeds is hazardous. The existence of minimum
speed limits obviously supports this view.
4. Consider, for example, the instructions for S.E.C. Form l-A, Part II, Offering Circular Model
A, Offering and Price Factors, Item 6. The instructions to the issuer are to show the multiple of earn-
ings at which the shares are offered with specifications as to how that calculation must be made, how
the number of shares must be adjusted for stock splits and recapitalizations, etc.
5. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Com.
petition for Price Efficiency, 44 J. FIN. 633 (1989); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclo.
sure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 417 (1996). Both articles recog-
nize that a uniform, standardized method of disclosing financial information, used by all finns, confers
a large benefit on investors by allowing them to more easily understand and compare corporations'
performance.
6. This Paper will not follow the "rules" versus "standards" distinction popular in academic arti-
cles. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. 557
(1992). Comparing precise "rules" to vague "standards" misleadingly suggests only two choices of
precision or vagueness. This article analyzes vagueness as a question of degree and talks of limits as
being more or less vague, whose violation is penalized.
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damages their conduct has caused.7 More apt examples from the vast set
of vague rules are veil-piercing and securities fraud liability of issuers.
Corporate parents are liable for the debts of their subsidiaries under the
veil-piercing doctrine if they fail to maintain a sufficiently separate per-
sona The variety in conducts under vague rules exceed that observed in
conducts governed by precise rules, such as driving speeds and corporate
accounting. In other words, under vague rules different potential injurers
choose very different levels of care; different parent corporations choose
very different patterns of group "separateness;" and different issuers adopt
very different policies of corporate disclosure. By contrast, the speed of
different drivers does not differ much, and neither does the disclosure form
used by different issuers in their SEC filings.
Practically every strain of legal theory has analyzed the issue of vague-
ness in legal rules. In practice, vagueness seems to dominate to such a
degree that it is difficult to find examples of precise rules. Vague standards
are common in our legal system and are the focus of classroom discussion
in law schools. Consider, for example, the vague boundaries of constitu-
tionally protected speech, the numerous "reasonableness" standards in-
cluding that of negligence, the very vague corporate veil-piercing doctrine,
and the vague "enhanced business judgment rule" of appraising corporate
takeover defenses.9 Practitioners and risk-averse individuals dislike the
uncertainty imposed by vague rules. Theory, moreover, supports them
because differentiation of conducts can also be obtained by precise rules.
Where the law seeks to induce different conducts, a perfect system would
7. See Jason S. Johnston, Bajesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Tomurd an Economic Thzory of
Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137 (1987) (providing an analysis of negligence in
these terms). It is important to note that most work on negligence chooses as its basis the apparently
precise Hand Formula. The ("marginal") Hand Formula purports to set a precise limit for carel ss-
ness-the point where any further decrease in care increases the expected injury more than it reduces
the injurer's costs. But, even to the extent that the Hand Formula is applied, it produces a vague stan-
dard of negligence since neither the cost of care nor the expected injury are known with precision. See
Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Fornulda, 80 VA. L REV. 1015 (1994) (discussing the non-
application of the Hand Formula); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic 77treory of Negligence, 92
YALE LJ. 799 (1983) (critiquing the desirability of the Hand Formula); Thomas J. Miceli, Cause in
Fact, Proximate Cause, and the Hand Rule: Etending Grady's Positive Economic TMeory of Negli-
gence, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 473 (1996) (critiquing the desirability of the Hand Formula).
8. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirlcal Study, 76 CORNELL L
REv. 1036 (1991) (describing and providing an empirical analysis of the factors that courts take into
account in veil-piercing decisions).
9. The enhanced business judgement rule departs from the business judgement nile, which up-
holds all corporate decisions of the board of directors that are made with appropriate information and
without conflict of interest. The enhanced business judgement rule applies to defensive tactics--where
a conflict of interests, between managers trying to preserve their jobs and shareholders who desire a
takeover premium, is practically inherent--and requires that defensive measures be proportionate to
the threat posed by the hostile acquiror. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleun Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949
(Del. 1985) ("On this record we are satisfied that the [defensive] device Unocal adopted is reasonable
in relation to the threat posed.. .").
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have a sufficiently complex rule that produces the different mandates.
Each different mandate would, therefore, be precise. This claim that
vagueness is unnecessary, however, ignores the cost of complexity, which,
for the time being, seems to argue in favor of vagueness in a vast number
of areas. Moreover, rules are fast becoming so complex that they defy
predictability by less than omniscient subjects.
The desirability of vagueness has been examined by many authors in
the law and economics tradition. Previous analyses that have dealt with
precision frequently assume that precision is desirable, and examine the
compromise between the cost of drafting a precise rule at the legislative
stage and the cost of applying a vague standard at the judicial stage.'"
Closer to the spirit of this article is the analysis of Craswell and Calfee who
argue that vagueness both increases and decreases deterrence, an argument
that this paper formalizes." Even they, however, do not discuss differ-
ences in conduct because in their model all individuals are identical and
make the same choices.
This paper contributes to the discussion of deterrence by exploring the
effects of vagueness and by formalizing the regulator's choice of a limit's
vagueness. Traditional models of deterrence show that most defendants
have incentives to comply exactly with the precise limit. 2 Vague limits
have been shown to eliminate this incentive for exact compliance-vague
limits deter sometimes more and sometimes less than their precise counter-
parts. 3 This paper combines, formalizes and expands these results by ex-
ploring the effects, and the optimal choice, of vagueness.
But the principal contribution of this article regards the choice of
vagueness as a determinant of the distribution of conducts. The desired
distribution of conducts, which existing commentary sidesteps, is an inte-
gral result of rule-making and must not continue to be ignored.
Although the Enlightenment authors who engaged in analysis of deter-
rence may have discussed vagueness informally, 4 recent thinking on deter-
10. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ.
65 (1983); Anthony 1. Ogus, Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making, In THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO LAW 210 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981).
11. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79,
83-85 (1982); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 n.20 (1980).
13. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 976-78 (1984); Cooter, supra note 12, at 100-01.
14. See, e.g., CESARE BECcARtA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 93-94
(Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963).
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rence does not focus on vagueness."5 Those modem works that do focus on
vagueness tend to have limited scope, and analyze it primarily in the con-
text of negligence liability, 6 or with regard to other specific regulatory
fields, such as environmental law. In all these works, the question of
vagueness is approached without regard to the uniformity or correlation of
conducts, and optimal conduct often depends on the costs and benefits of
each individual separately. This article, however, suggests that the desired
correlation (or uniformity) between conducts determines the optimal
vagueness of rules. A vague speed limit, for example, will allow drivers to
choose different speeds, but will, nevertheless, induce some reduction in
the average speed. A precise limit, on the other hand, will induce greater
correlation or uniformity of speeds around the limit. In activities where
strong correlation is desired, the rules should be precise (as in speeding or
financial disclosure). Where correlation is irrelevant, rules ought to be
vague (as in negligence or corporate veil-piercing). 7
Vagueness also appears undesirable if a limit is considered to provide
incentives for individuals to follow a socially optimal conduct. However,
many limits are clearly only approximations of optimal conduct. Why 65
mph and not 66 or 70 mph? Why 65 parts per million (ppm) pollution in-
stead of 55 ppm? In a negligence context, why "reasonable care"? When
limits that lead to optimal conduct cannot be written, we get by with surro-
gates. Their precision, this article argues, should be set according to the
concentration, the uniformity, or the correlation of conducts sought to be
induced.
Some commentators have argued that the structure of negligence li-
ability as a limit (as opposed to strict liability) is justified given the uncer-
tain outcome of the litigation process. 8 This article justifies both the un-
certainty of negligence liability, as well as the uncertainty of litigation from
a different perspective, namely that different injurers need not employ the
same care. Society does not have an interest in having all potential injurers
apply the same amount of care. Correlation and, therefore, precision are
irrelevant from the perspective of social welfare. Vague limits and uncer-
tain trials allow variation among conducts according to individual cost-
benefit calculations. Thus, potential injurers can choose different levels of
care depending on their own circumstances.
15. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL ECON. 169, 176-90
(1968); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L REV. 1193 (1985).
16. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 15, Craswell & Calfee, supra note 11.
17. The argument that vagueness may be desirable has also been made informally by Gillian Had-
field, who analogizes vague rules with incomplete contracts. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the
Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision In the law, 82 CAL. L REV. 541, 547
(1994).
18. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 12; Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of
Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987).
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Section II of this article introduces the model of individuals who react
to vague limits. As previous commentators have pointed out, vague limits
still provide deterrence. 9 Their deterrent effect, however, is felt gradually,
which results in individuals no longer exactly complying with the limit.
Instead, conducts become more dispersed as vagueness increases.
Sections III and IV of this article refute the superficial conclusion that
precision always concentrates conduct. Section III shows that precision
cannot overcome bad placement of limits. If a limit is too severe for the
tastes of a society, it polarizes conducts, separating those who observe the
limit from those who violate it. A vaguer limit at the same location would
provide a middle ground and restore continuity in the society's conducts.
Finally, section IV of this article examines expressions of a general
dispersing effect that precise limits have: they disperse conducts above the
limit. Three expressions of this phenomenon are strikingly frequent: im-
precise enforcement, fixed penalties (even fixed fractions of penalties), and
trial procedure. They all disperse conducts and increasing vagueness al-
ways reduces this polarization.
II. A MODEL OF REACTIONS TO LIMITS
Beginning with an example will facilitate a necessarily complex expo-
sition. Consider a vague speed limit of 65±10 mph and different drivers.
Each driver chooses a different speed depending on her preference, i.e.,
depending on whether she is pressed, whether she is a nature lover,
whether she is a spendthrift, accident-prone, etc.2" Drivers with prefer-
ences well in excess of the limit, i.e., those who desire speeds of over 75
mph, will find testing or bucking the limit worthwhile, even though they
will be penalized if their conduct is held to be a violation. Some drivers,
who prefer a speed of, say, 95 mph or higher, might even consider a certain
violation worthwhile. But drivers who would have exceeded the limit only
slightly will find the inconvenience of complying with the limit negligible.
A limit is vague by being random and, hence, the specific realizations
within its range cannot be known in advance. Moreover, let us suppose
that the apprehension of violators and their adjudication are costless and
certain, and that no other source of uncertainty exists.2 Hence, individu-
als, who choose speeds below the minimum of the limit's range (less than
55 mph in our example of a 65±10 mph limit) are certain that they will not
19. See Johnston, supra note 18, Craswell & Calfee, supra note 11.
20. In this article "preferences" will refer to the level of the activity that would have been chosen if
there were no limit, and "conducts" will refer to the levels of activity chosen after the limit is taken Into
account.
21. Thus, this model is distinguished from models of uncertain apprehension or adjudication. See,




be held in violation of the limit while individuals whose speeds exceed the
maximum of the limit's range (over 75 mph in our example) can be sure
that they will be penalized (although they do not know the exact limit that
will be used to calculate their penalty if the penalty depends on the limit).'
Each individual has a unique preferred level of conduct that she would
pursue if she were not subject to regulation. Regulation induces individu-
als to change their behavior toward compliance of limits. However, every
equal incremental reduction of conduct becomes increasingly undesirable
the further it takes individuals from their respective preferences!' Effec-
tively, then those who would have chosen conducts well in excess of the
limit find it more onerous complying than those whose preferences are for
complying or for only barely violating the limit.
Violations of the limit lead to penalties. Since different levels of con-
duct lead to different penalties, penalties depend on conduct or, to be more
precise, on the severity of the violation, or the degree by which a conduct
exceeds the limit. This does not imply, however, a specific relation be-
tween the size of the violation and the penalty. Penalties may increase at
changing rates as the severity of the violation increases.
Since individuals take penalties into account when choosing their con-
duct, they face an additional problem if the limit is vague. A vague limit
implies uncertainty regarding the location of the limit and, therefore, un-
certainty regarding the size of the penalty that a violation would trigger. In
determining the most favorable conduct, individuals form an expectation
about the penalty that would correspond to each kind of conduct. Although
most do this unconsciously, the formal process would be to use each possi-
ble realization of the random limit, find the penalty it would imply, and
calculate the weighted average of all possible penalties, each weighted by
its probability. Thus, if the vague speed limit is 60 mph half the time and
70 mph the other half of the time, and the penalty is $10 for every mile
above the limit, a driver going 69 mph has a $45 expected penalty: 50%*9
mph*$10. One who drives at 71 mph has a $60 expected penalty: 50%*l 1
mph*$10 + 50%*1 mph*$10. Note that if individuals are risk-averse they
22. An intuitive example of such a limit is the limit on carelessness--negligence. The "reasonable
man" standard does not give a precise and knowable single-point limit for carelessness beyond which
liability will arise and below which liability cannot arise. The negligence limit on carelessness is very
much like a random variable, a realization of which will usually be drawn by thejury. Thus, this model
is also distinguishable from models of negligence which use a knowable "reasonable man" standard of
negligence. See, e.g., VILLtAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOI.C STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 126-27 (1987).
23. Thus, for example, a driver with a preference for 70 mph suffers little when forced to reduce
her speed to 65 mph, but more than that for the equal reduction of speed to 60 mph, and even more for
the further, but still equal, reduction to 55 mph. This is a negative statement of the law of diminishing
returns, which would have (equal) increases in conduct be less desirable as one approaches one's opti-
mal conduct In the context of the example, the return from an increase of speed from 55 to 60 mph is
great, but the return from the identical 5 mph increase drops when going from 60 to 65 mph, and then it
drops further when going from 65 to 70 mph.
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will consider the gamble involved in violating the vague limit an additional
undesirable feature and will comply a little more.24 For simplicity, how-
ever, we assume individuals are risk-neutral.
To observe the effects of vagueness on deterrence we must compare
vague limits with precise limits by keeping the position of the limit identi-
cal in both cases. The position of the vague limit is its average position or
the mean of its distribution. Thus, if a vague "reasonable speed" limit is
interpreted so that speeders are penalized for exceeding, on average, 65
mph, the appropriate precise limit for comparison is one of 65 mph. Such a
comparison is made in Figure 1.
The reaction to the precise limit separates three groups of individuals:
those to whom the limit is irrelevant; those who choose to comply with the
limit, and finally, those who disregard it.' For the first group the limit is
irrelevant because they have no desire to violate it. Their preference is for
a speed of under 65 mph and that is the conduct that they will always
choose. The limit, however, becomes relevant starting with those who
have a preference for a speed slightly exceeding 65 mph and are deterred
by the penalty it produces. Deterrence is produced because a little speed
needs to be given up to avoid the penalty. Individuals, who have prefer-
ences for speeds exceeding the limit, but are induced to abide by the limit,
form the complying group. At some preference for even greater speed,
however, the deterrent effect of the penalty fails and individuals with such
preferences will choose to violate the limit. These individuals are not de-
terred because their preferences exceed the limit by so much that they con-
sider the penalty preferable to complying with the limit. Those who delib-
erately choose to violate the limit form the group that disregards the limit.
Vague limits produce a more complex picture insofar as the complying
group must be divided into two sub-groups. Suppose that the vagueness of
the limit extends from 55 to 75 mph. The group to which the limit is ir-
relevant now only encompasses individuals with preferences for a speed up
to 55 mph (as opposed to 65 mph in the case of the precise limit). From
that point starts the "apprehensive" group of individuals, who adjust their
conduct downward (compared to what it would have been under a more
24. See, e.g., Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why
Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131 (1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV.
880 (1979).
25. Individuals' preferences regarding their conduct will differ and so will their compromises
between saving on the penalty and reducing conduct In order to study individuals' reactions in some
orderly fashion, it is necessary to say that all individuals with a given preference follow the same con-
duct, without allowing individual variation. As simplifications go, this is not radical at all. While each
one of the individuals who shares a preference for a specific level of conduct will react differently to a
penalty, it is always possible to group them and find their average reaction. Thus, the penalty maps
average reactions to preferences. Mapping precise reactions to preferences strips a thin layer of com-
plexity for a large gain in clarity.
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precise limit). Effectively, it appears as if they fear committing a violation
and trim their speeds accordingly.
Eventually, however, we reach individuals whose speed equals 65
mph, the average of the limit. The preference to which this conduct corre-
sponds is not observable but is crucial. Let us call this preference the limit-
inducing preference. This limit-inducing preference separates the com-
plying group into the "apprehensive" group and the "bucking" group. Be-
fore exploring this, however, it is worth stepping back and locating the
limit-inducing preference in a precise limit. Because in a precise limit the
entire complying group follows the same conduct, we cannot identify the
one preference that would remain unchanged if the limit became vague.
But given that the lower half of the complying group will reduce its con-
duct (becoming the "apprehensive" group) while the upper half will in-
crease its conduct (to become the "bucking" group), the limit-inducing
preference is, in fact, the middle preference of the complying group. Thus,
if the precise 65 mph limit is observed by all drivers with preferences from
65 to 75, the limit-inducing preference is 70 mph.
Individuals with preferences higher than the limit-inducing preference
will choose speeds exceeding the average of the limit, i.e., greater than 65
mph. Since in a world with the more precise limit these individuals would
still have been complying---they would have chosen 65 mph-they appear
to be "bucking" the limit, stretching it without committing a certain viola-
tion. Their choice is made most obvious by the choices facing the greatest-
speed-preferring driver who would still comply with the precise limit (sup-
pose that is the driver who prefers a speed of 75 mph, who under the pre-
cise limit would still comply and drive at 65 mph). If this driver had a
preference for any higher speed he would violate the limit, i.e., the driver
who prefers 76 mph chooses 66 mph under the precise limit. When the
limit becomes vague, the old complying conduct will seem too low because
an increase in speed no longer leads to a certain violation. Under the vague
65±10 mph limit, a speed of 65 mph is a violation only half the time and a
speed of 66 mph is still not very likely to be one. Retaining the previous
speed of 65 mph leads to an only 50% chance of a violation, while the
driver who prefers 75 mph was ready to accept a certain violation under the
precise limit.
The following illustration, produced using a simple model, shows this
effect of vagueness by plotting the conduct to which each preference would
be led under the two limits. Below the limit-inducing preference, vague-
26. The model posits quadratic utility functions and a linear penalty. Individuals %ith preferences f
choose conduct c and enjoy utility u(c)=-s(f-) 2, where s is a scaling factor. Penalties po are deter-
mined by subtracting the realization of the limit t from conduct c: p(c)-m(c-t), where m Is the penalty
multiplier. The vagueness of the limit is illustrated by using the triangular distribution. This produces
a tent-like triangle instead of the bell curve. Its probability density function is simple. 4(x-min)f(m,_-
min)2 from its minimum (min) to its average and 4(max-x)f(rnx.mln)? from ther to the mxdmum
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ness increases deterrence (reduces the conduct to which an individual with
a given preference is led) and above it, vagueness reduces deterrence (in-
creases conduct).
The Effect of Vagueness: Conducts and Preferences as
Vagueness Changes
Conducts Disregar




Figure 1: This figure illustrates the differences in the deterrence that a vague limit provides
from a precise one. The plots show the conducts (along the y axis) chosen by individuals with differ-
ent preferences (along the x axis) when they are subject to a vague (solid line) and an almost precise
(dashing line) limit. The limits are also marked along the y-axis with the lighter shading correspond-
ing to the range of the vaguer limit and the darker shading corresponding to that of the more precise
one. Four areas in the graph deserve note. In the "Apprehension" area, individuals are deterred more
by the vague limit. The small probability of violating the limit is enough to induce them to follow
lower conducts. In the "Bucking" area, the vagueness of the limit reduces deterrence. Here the limit's
vagueness even gives some respite to individuals who would accept a certain violation if they were
subject to the precise limit. The limit is irrelevant to the choice of conduct in the "Irrelevance" area,
because choosing one's preference will never violate the limit. The choices of those who decide to
violate the limit deliberately and with certainty are marked by the "Disregard" area. Here changing
vagueness has no effect as long as the precise limit is equal to the average of the vague limit. Individu-
als are assumed throughout not to be averse to risk.
Thus, the first consequence of vagueness is varied deterrence. A precise
(max). Its average is the midpoint: (max+min)2. The optimization problem of individuals Is solved
for conducts below and above the average and the preferences where they cross the average and where
they accept a certain violation are established so that the figure can be produced. A Mathematica®
notebook file with this analysis is available from the author or from
http://homepages.msn.conlLibraryLawnlProf.NLGwrting.htm. The symmetry of the figure is due to
an additional assumption of the model: that equal reductions of conduct are equally burdensome re-
gardless of each individual's preference.
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limit induces both fast and slow drivers to follow the same conduct.
Vagueness lets them differentiate their conduct. The fast choose a faster
speed and the slow a slower one. This happens while the average speed is
mostly maintained. To the extent that a limit has as its goal the imposition
of a given average or aggregate conduct, it can be achieved with either a
precise or vague limit. The vague limit is superior because it achieves the
desired average conduct in a manner similar-although not identical-to a
trade between the fast and slow drivers in which those who value speed
more buy the right to speed from the others.
A different effect of vagueness, however, is more important from the
perspective of social welfare. As vagueness induces the fast to approach
their desired speeds while the slow reduce theirs, the overall effect on a
society of individuals with various preferences is that vagueness disperses
conducts that otherwise would be crowded at the neighborhood of the pre-
cise limit. Unlike the variation in deterrence discussed above, the fact that
vagueness determines dispersion has the broader consequence that it be-
comes a tool for the social planner. A planner who determines the desired
aggregate or average conduct (such as speed or levels of pollution) can
adjust the vagueness of limits to induce the desired dispersion or distribu-
tion of conducts.
Therefore, the vagueness of different limits should be determined with
regard to the desired dispersion sought to be induced. When concentrated
conducts are not a justified goal, a limit need not be precise. Just as the
placement of the limit receives attention and requires justification and le-
gitimation, its precision should be treated in the same manner. The need
for concentrated conducts must be justified and the imposition of concen-
tration must be legitimated before a precise limit is chosen over a vague
one.
III. DISPERSION THROUGH PRECISION
That precision performs a concentrating function in the abstract does
not, however, mean that, in fact, precision always induces conducts that are
less dispersed than those produced by equivalent vaguer limits. The actual
concentrating effect of precision depends on the distribution of preferences
in the population as well as on the location of the limit. As this section will
show, precision in limits that are too restrictive leads to greater dispersion
of conducts than the dispersion to which slightly vaguer limits would lead.
Obviously, some extreme limits may have no effect on the dispersion
of conducts. A limit greater than the most extreme conduct desired by any
member of society is irrelevant. But under some fairly ordinary con-
straints, a limit that is so strict that even the individual with the least pref-
erence would decide to violate it, will have the same effect: all individuals
will change their conduct to mitigate their penalties, but they will change
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them by the same amount, so that the dispersion of conducts will not
change despite the change of conducts.27 Barring these two extremes, one
might think that as a general rule, a limit that lies within the population's
preferences would concentrate conduct. Although that is true, the conclu-
sion that a precise limit always concentrates conduct more than a vague
one is false. Under some circumstances, vagueness increases concentra-
tion.
An austere (strict) precise limit causes a concentration of conducts at
the limit, say, 65 mph. Immediately above the limit, say at 66 to 70 mph,
there will be some less popular conducts. Further above the limit, say at 75
to 80 mph, lie the conducts chosen by the bulk of the population, who have
decided to accept the certain penalty. Thus, an austere precise limit segre-
gates conduct into two clusters, at 65 mph and at 75 to 80 mph. If we plot
the frequencies of each conduct, the resulting plot of the distribution has
two peaks, one at 65 mph and one at 77.5 mph. By contrast, a vaguer limit
that is placed to have the same average position at 65=l:10mph will have a
more gradual effect on conducts, thereby alleviating the polarizing of pre-
cision. Unlike the precise limit, which induces drivers who prefer 75 mph
to drive at 65 mph, the vaguer limit induces a smaller reduction of conduct
on them and pushes higher the cluster of drivers who would have chosen
65 mph to, say, a range of 65 to 75 mph. The following diagram illustrates
this effect by plotting the frequency of each conduct in a society with a
normal ("bell-curve") distribution of preferences. The figure compares the
distribution of conducts according to the precise and the vague rules.
27. Thus, if all drivers' preferences ranged from 50 to 70 mph, a speed limit of 35 mph would have
no concentrating effect if even the drivers who prefer 50 mph decide to violate it. They would choose
to drive at, say, 40 mph, and the range of conducts will be from 40 to 60 mph. Despite the limit's
precision and its reduction of conducts by 10 mph, the overall dispersion of conducts has not changed.
Conducts still span 20 mph, from 40 to 60 mph.
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Figure 2: This figure plots the distribution (density) of conducts under an austere and rela-
tively precise limit (solid line) and compares them with the conducts that wuld be produced by a less
precise limit (dashing line). The two limits have the same average (mean) but differ in vagueness. The
dashing vertical lines indicate the upper end of the vagueness range for each limit. The preferences of
the individuals of this society are normally distributed and both limits' vagueness follow the triangu-
lar distribution, which is explained in note 26.
The failure of precision to invariably induce concentration of conducts is
crucial because its concentrating effect is thought to be its only concrete
virtue. 2e This analysis will now expand by examining features beyond the
most general considered above. The framework developed from the previ-
ous sections leads to interesting results when it is used to examine specific
phenomena of enforcement.
IV. DISPERSING EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATING RULEs
That rules may have dispersing effects is in no way unusual, since
some rules aim to disperse conducts. That limits may disperse conducts,
however, is notable, because the principal function of limits appears to be
the concentration of conducts. This discussion will visit three causes of
dispersion that may accompany limits: imprecise enforcement, fixed pen-
alties, and procedure.
All three of these dispersing phenomena are local, i.e. only conducts
that correspond to some small range of preferences are dispersed. For ex-
ample, preferences from 80 to 85 mph will be induced to follow conducts
from 70 to 78 mph. Moreover, as vagueness mitigates the double-
clustering examined above, in all these phenomena, increasing the limit's
vagueness reduces dispersion. Because the dispersion as well as the miti-
gating effect of vagueness have the same cause across all these phenomena,
28. Precision may also provide comfort to risk averse citizens. I have argued that uncertainty is
still superior. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Predictabllity and Legal Evolution, 17 INT'L REV. L
& ECON. 475 (1997).
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they are worth explaining before we focus on each.
Limits provide incentives to change conduct by creating an expected
penalty associated with certain kinds of conduct. The expected penalty
reflects how these conducts are penalized on average.29 It is calculated by
multiplying the likelihood of the penalty with the likely size of that pen-
alty. The incentive to reduce some conducts is created because lower con-
ducts imply lower expected penalties, either because the probability of a
violation is lower or because the size of the penalty is smaller, or both.
Individuals will reduce their expected penalty until a further reduction is
not beneficial, i.e. until they would be hurt more from reducing their con-
duct than they would benefit by reducing the expected penalty. This is the
traditional economic concept of equalizing marginal cost and benefit.
This analysis supposes that the deterrence of a penalty does not depend
on preferences. It assumes that penalties change at a constant linear rate
and that individuals compromise the same way, meaning that equal reduc-
tions of conduct from their (different) preferences are equally
undesirable.3" The rate of change of the marginal expected penalty deter-
mines whether it will induce concentration or dispersion. An increasingly
increasing penalty implies concentration and a decreasingly increasing
penalty implies dispersion. If the penalty increases increasingly, those with
greater preferences will face larger penalties and be deterred more than
those with smaller preferences. Thus, increasingly increasing penalties
induce the two groups to follow conducts that differ less than the difference
of their preferences. Compare, for example, a driver who prefers 79 mph
to one who prefers 99 mph. An increasingly increasing penalty would de-
ter the faster driver more than the slower one. Suppose that the expected
penalties are $10 for exceeding 60 mph, $20 for exceeding 70 mph, $40 for
exceeding 80 mph, and $60 for exceeding 90 mph. The first 10 mph re-
duction (from 79 to 69 mph) saves $10 of penalty for the slower driver and
the second 10 mph reduction saves him an additional $10. The fast driver,
29. If, for example, the limit is either 55 or 65 mph with equal likelihood, and fines are $10 per
mile above the limit, a conduct of 65 mph will attract with equal likelihood either a penalty of $100 or
no penalty at all. Thus, this conduct corresponds to an expected penalty of 50%o*10mph*$10+0, or
$50.
30. This translates to utility functions of identical shapes. The analysis applies, however, not only
for penalties that change with increasing or decreasing rates but also as long as the differences of indi-
vidual utility fimctions are well behaved, so that, as preferences increase, equal reductions become
either consistently more or consistently less undesirable (these effects would correspond to utility
functions that become either more or less peaked as preferences increase). Suppose that the expected
penalty increases with conduct at a constant rate. Then the deterrent effect would be constant and all
violators would reduce their conduct equally if they compromise the same way. If reductions of con-
duct become more painful as preferences increase, then violators desiring greater conducts would be
deterred less. If reductions of conduct become less burdensome as preferences increase, then deter-
rence would increase with preferences. This distinction will be left to the reader from now on and the
Paper will only describe the reactions where all equal compromises are equally undesirable regardless
of preference.
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however, saves $20 by reducing speed by each of the first two 10 mph re-
ductions.3 Assume that decreasing speed by the first 10 mph costs $8 to
both drivers. Therefore, they are deterred into reducing their speeds by at
least 10 mph. If decreasing speed by the second 10 mph costs $15 to both
drivers, the slower one would prefer to pay the larger penalty and would
not be further deterred. He would, hence, reduce his speed only from 79 to
69 mph. The faster driver will, however, prefer to slow down more?" He
will make a second 10 mph reduction because doing so saves him $20 at
the cost of $15, and he will, therefore, choose to drive at 79 mph. Al-
though the two drivers' preferences differ by 20 mph their conducts are
concentrated and differ only by 10 mph.
By contrast, if the penalty were to increase at a decreasing rate, it
would imply less deterrence for those with higher preferences, while those
with smaller preferences face greater deterrence. Hence, decreasingly in-
creasing penalties induce the two groups to follow conducts that differ
more than the difference of their preferences. A limit will have a dispers-
ing effect if its expected penalty increases at a decreasing rate for any
range of conducts. Change the penalty of the previous example to a de-
creasingly increasing one: $10 for exceeding 60 mph, $20 for exceeding 70
mph, $25 for exceeding 80 mph and $30 for exceeding 90 mph. The pen-
alty increases by $10 for breaking 60 and 70 mph, but only by $5 for
breaking 80 and 90 mph. The slow driver faces the same deterrence and
chooses a reduction of 10 mph. The fast driver, however, will not be de-
terred at all, because even the first 10 mph reduction of speed saves him
less in penalty ($5) than his subjective $8 cost of slowing down. Hence the
decreasingly increasing penalty leads to conducts that differ by more (30
mph) than the drivers' preferences, which differ by 20 mph.
The following sections discuss specific expressions of the dispersing
effect that decreasingly increasing penalties generally have on the distribu-
tion of conducts. Vagueness mitigates this dispersing effect by smoothen-
ing expected penalty functions and softening the peaks and valleys of the
expected penalty. When the expected penalty changes less abruptly, its
rates of change are smaller and the changes of these rates of change are, in
turn, reduced. Thus, vagueness slows the decrease of decreasingly in-
creasing penalties. This implies that vagueness reduces the amount by
which conducts are led to differ. Instead of the 30 mph difference in the
above example, a vaguer limit might induce a smaller difference of 25 mph
in the conducts of the two drivers whose preferences differ by 20 mph.
Focusing on actual occurrences of these dynamics will show the prac-
31. Since 99 mph corresponds to a $60 fine, the reduction to 89 mph, and a S40 fine, saves S20.
Slowing to 79 mph, and a $20 fine, saves another $20.
32. To ensure that the fast one will be deterred no more than a total of 20 mph, IMnke the third
incremental 10 mph reduction of speed cost $25 to the drivers.
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tical importance of this analysis. Imprecise enforcement (as in the falsely
imprisoned in the Count of Montechristo and the prosecution of the be-
nevolent by the evil in The Hunchback of Notre-Dame and Robin Hood),
fixed penalties and complex trials (as in Bleak House) are what legal thrill-
ers are made of. They are also prime examples of the imperfections of any
legal system. What is surprising is that the dispersion of conducts they
cause is mitigated by another "imperfection" of the legal system, vague-
ness.
A. Imprecise Enforcement
Imprecise enforcement appears unrelated to vague limits. After all, a
limit may be perfectly precise and only its enforcement uncertain.
Granted, if the probability of enforcement bears no relation to conduct,
penalties for all conducts over the limit will be equally discounted. Under
this construct, imprecise enforcement influences the amount of the ex-
pected penalty but does not influence whether the penalty increases at an
increasing or decreasing rate. Where such an across-the-board uncertainty
causes insufficient deterrence, it can be remedied by the conventional "l/p"
adjustment: Nominal penalties should be increased to compensate for the
uncertainty that they will be imposed.3
33. See Becker, supra note 15; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:
An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (arguing that jury instructions should include
directions on adjusting punitive damages for the probability of detection and prosecution). Once Im-
precise enforcement takes into account conduct, as discussed in the text immediately below, the lip
adjustment can be reintroduced to cure that effect. However, if the lip adjustment is combined with
inaccurate observation of conduct, the result will be a gradually increasing penalty function matching
the penalty that is expected under a precisely enforced vague limit. Inaccurate observation Is a very
likely phenomenon and its fear probably drives the resistance to a purist lip adjustment that would
impose very large penalties for very slight infractions. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want
Optimal Deterrence? (John M. Olin Law & Economics, University of Chicago Working Paper No. 77),
available at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/PublicationsWorking/> (documenting this fear). The
inaccurate observation of conduct would influence individuals contemplating conducts immediately
below the limit but which conducts are close enough to the limit for some erroneous observations of
those conducts to find them violating the limit. Those individuals would be deterred, even though they
would not violate the limit. Thus, the I/p-adjusted penalty starts being felt at conducts below the limit.
At some high level of conduct, however, all the possible inaccurate perceptions of it would be viola-
tions. Thus, gradually the effect of the l/p-adjusted penalty with inaccurately observed conduct pro-
duces expected penalties identical with those of the nominal expected penalty. When all erroneously
observed conducts are violations, then risk-neutral individuals treat the expected 1/p-adjusted penalty
with inaccurately observed conducts the same as the I/p-adjusted penalty with accurate observation of
conducts.
Risk-aversion, however, may aggravate the problem of inaccurate perceptions. Risk aversion
means that individuals are averse to the probabilistic outcome compared to its certain equivalent: a 10%
chance of losing $100 is more undesirable than the certain loss of $10. The I/p adjustment makes all
expected penalties equal to their equivalent nominal penalty under perfect enforcement, but this Is a
probabilistic calculation which ignores risk-aversion. The lowest probabilities of apprehension, where
the i/p adjustment leads to very large actual penalties, could impress the risk-averse as harsher than the
(larger in risk-neutral terms) expected penalties of larger violations. Thus, the lip adjustment may not
cure the dispersing effect of imprecise enforcement, but may move it from the top of the vagueness
[Vol. 32:451
VAGUENESSAND DISRIBUTON OF CONDUCTS
A different effect surfaces, however, if enforcement is imprecise, but is
correlated with the defendant's conduct. When large violations are more
likely to be detected and penalized, the effect of the uncertainty is not less
deterrence across all conducts, but only less deterrence of small violations.
This resulting character of the deterrence looks much like that of a vague
limit, where small incursions into the vagueness range are unlikely to be
penalized, but large ones are almost certain to be held violations.' Unlike
the paradigmatic vague limit where the penalty depends on the limit's re-
alization--say on the jury which decides as "reasonable" a speed of 61
mph in the case of a vague 6510 mph limit and, therefore, punishes a 65
mph driver for exceeding the limit by 4 mph--the penalty under imprecise
enforcement does not depend on the limit's realization but on the nominal
precise limit. If the nominal limit is 55 mph, and a 65 mph driver has a
50% chance of being apprehended, the penalty will always be for a 10 mph
violation.
An example of a nominally precise limit would be a speed limit of 60
mph. Imprecise enforcement depending on conduct would imply that driv-
ers speeding at 61 or 62 mph are rarely penalized while drivers racing at 90
or 95 mph are almost always penalized. Unlike under the true vague limit,
however, all penalties are calculated on the basis of how much the speed
exceeds 60 mph (as opposed to the enforcer's subjective view of what the
appropriate limit is). In a precisely enforced but truly vague limit-say, of
"reasonable speed"-sometimes the limit will be 60 mph and sometimes
not; a speed of 70 mph could sometimes be considered a significant trans-
gression and sometimes a trivial one.
This difference between imprecise enforcement of precise nominal
limits and precisely enforced vague limits means that the expected penalty
for large (and certain) violations is larger under imprecisely enforced limits
than the expected penalty for vague limits but that both increase at the
same rate. Since expected penalties under both imprecisely enforced limits
and vague limits start together, and the expected penalty of imprecise en-
forcement ends higher, it increases more rapidly in some range. This hap-
pens in the range where apprehension fast approaches certainty. The tran-
sition from this fast increase to the slower one of certain apprehension is
where imprecise enforcement produces the decreasingly increasing penal-
ties that cause a dispersing effect on conducts.
To see an illustration, let us make the imprecise enforcement of speed
limits concrete: The probability of apprehension reaches certainty at 80
mph, i.e., it increases by 5% every mile between 60 mph and 80 mph. The
range to the bottom. Vagueness, of course, cannot cure this problem, since the lUp ajustment %ill
compensate for changes in vagueness.
34. Compare the example of a 55 mph precise limit, with imprecise enforcement that becomes
certain at 75 mph, to a vague limit of 65110 mph. A speed of 58 mph leads to a small expected penalty
under both systems. A speed of 75 mph also leads to a certain penalty under both.
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nominal penalty is $10 per mile over the 60 mph limit. The change in the
penalty between 80 mph and 81 mph-both violations that lead to certain
apprehension-is $10. From 79 mph to 80 mph, however, the penalty in-
creases at a faster rate: The penalty for 79 mph is $180.50 (19 mph * 95%
* $10 ), versus a certain $200 for 80 mph. Thus, the penalty increases de-
creasingly: It increases by $19.5 from 79 to 80 mph but only by $10 from
80 to 81 mph (21 mph * 100% * $10 - 20 mph * 100% * $10). A driver
who would have slowed down from 81 to 80 mph will also slow down to
79 mph. Hence two drivers who under a precisely enforced limit would
have chosen 80 and 81 mph will be dispersed by 1 more mile, and will
chose 79 and 81 mph, respectively.
Enforcement uncertainty in the real world is, of course, not likely to be
as stylized. But it is appropriate to model the uncertainty that results from
the cumulative effect of police inattention, paperwork mistakes, funding
shortages and all other causes of imprecise enforcement by using the
"normal distribution," often called the "bell curve." The unwieldy normal
distribution is again approximated to produce Figure 3 by using the easier
to handle triangular distribution. 5 Figure 3 shows that while penalties in-
crease at equal rates for small violations (the lower "equal" range in the
graph) and at equal rates again for large ones (the higher "equal" range in
the graph), the penalties differ, implying that the larger penalty of the im-
precise enforcement increases much more rapidly somewhere between
these two points where both limits produce equal deterrence. The rate of
change of the expected penalty corresponding to imprecise enforcement
reaches such great values that it eventually decreases (making the penalty
increase decreasingly) to equal that of the paradigmatic vague limit. This
can be seen in the lower graph of Figure 3.
The rate of change of the penalty for the imprecisely enforced limit is
largest at violations where apprehension starts becoming certain. At that
range (marked "accelerate" in Figure 3) violations already facing a large
nominal penalty rapidly approach certain enforcement. Once enforcement
is certain, the expected penalty becomes the nominal penalty because it
does not have to be adjusted for the possibility that it might not be en-
forced. When enforcement becomes absolutely certain, increases of con-
duct result in the smaller increases associated with the nominal penalty.
Thus, penalties increase decreasingly somewhere in between. This hap-
pens in the area of Figure 3 marked "decelerate." Notice that, by contrast,
no such phenomenon is associated with the genuine vague limit. The rate
of change of the expected penalty gradually increases to match that of a
35. This produces a tent-like triangle instead of the bell curve. Its probability density function Is
simple: 4(x-min)/(max-min) from its minimum (min) to its average and 4(max-x)/(max-mln9 from
there to the maximum (max). The corresponding cumulative distribution functions are derived by
integration and are 2(x-min)/(min-max) 2 and [(max-min)-2(x-max)2 /(min-max) 2, respectively. Its
average is the midpoint (max+min)/2.
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certain limit at the average position. Figure 3 again illustrates these com-
parisons.







Figure 3: This figure illustrates the difference beteen the expected penalty produced by
imprecise enforcement of a nominally precise limit (such as a 60 mph speed limit) and a precisely
enforced vague limit, where the size of the violation depends on the determination of the limit that
applies to each violation (such as "unreasonable speed" or "reasonable man" negligence). We see that
both penalties start with the same minuscule rate of increase of the penalty (slope) for conducts only
slightly exceeding the minimum of the vague limit t=- (which is the imprecisely enforced nominal
limit). This range is the leftmost area marked "equal" on the graphs. Both expected penalties end up
having the same rate of change, equal to the rate of change of the nominal penalty, for conducts ex-
ceeding the maximum of the vagueness range 6. (wich is the maximum of the range of uncertainty
for imprecise enforcement). This is the rightmost area of the graphs, marked "equni." But their devel-
opment differs between these points. The expected penalty of imprecise enforcement increases at an




Every legal system that has finite resources and depends on inaccurate
perceptions and noisy signals, imprecisely enforces its rules, which results
in dispersion of conducts. Vagueness mitigates this effect by softening the
transitions that a more precise enforcement would cause. Increased uncer-
tainty of enforcement expands the range where the penalty increases at a
rate greater than the certain penalty. The expanded range of the large rate
of increase allows the rate of increase to be less abrupt and to gradually
decrease thereafter.
Increasing the vagueness associated with imprecise enforcement with-
out changing the location of the nominal limit implies reduced deterrence
within the vagueness range. Conducts that had some likelihood of appre-
hension are now less likely to be apprehended. The broadened range of
uncertain enforcement also moves the area where conducts are dispersed
toward greater preferences. One way to cure the reduced deterrence would
be to increase the penalty. Increasing the penalty would, however, aggra-
vate the dispersing effect of imprecise enforcement.36 A better alternative
would be to reduce the limit. The lower limit would increase deterrence,
without the increased dispersion that the greater penalties will cause. An
example will illustrate.
Consider a society where the preferences for speeds are normally dis-
tributed around 70 ±10 mph (the standard deviation). Impose a limit of 55
mph, imprecisely enforced up to 65 mph, where apprehension becomes
certain. The probability of apprehension increases slowly at first, rapidly
around 60 mph and gradually reaches 100% as 65 mph is reached.37 We
shall compare the distribution of conducts produced by this relatively pre-
cisely enforced limit to a lower and more loosely enforced limit: a limit of
45 mph, imprecisely enforced up to 75 mph. Compare the speeds that two
drivers are induced to follow according to each rule. Jane Speedy, who
prefers a speed of 70 mph, suffers an additional loss of welfare of .16*(70 -
her speed) for each mile she slows down." Her best compromise under the
more precisely enforced rule is 60 mph.39 John McFast, who prefers a
36. Note, however, that the dispersion of conducts, which the greater penalties accentuated afler
increased vagueness mitigated it, may not be as significant if the greater preferences at which it occurs
are sufficiently rare.
37. This follows the triangular distribution, explained above. See supra note 35. It differs from the
more realistic normal distribution in that it is a finite distribution, producing absolute certainty above Its
maximum. It does, however, imitate the realism of the normal distribution because changes of prob-
abilities at its extremes are gradual.
38. This is the derivative of her optimization function o(speed)=-.08(70-speed)2, as defined In note
26. For I mile increments, using the center of the increment provides a fair approximation of the
change in welfare. For example, we can use 60.5 for the increment from 61 mph to 60 mph.
39. Her tenth mile of slowing down will hurt her about 0.16*9.5=1.52 (I use 9.5 instead of 10 in the
derivative to find the change in utility in the transition from the 9' to the 10' mile), while the eleventh
mile costs her 0.16*10.5=1.68. Her expected penalty as she slows from 61 to 60 mph will drop by
1.58. At 61 mph her expected penalty is the nominal penalty multiplied by the probability of apprehen-
sion, (61-55)G(61)--(61-55)((65-55) 2-2(61-65)2)/(55-65) 2, where G(x) is the cumulative distribution
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speed of 75 mph (with the same pain of .16*[75 - his speed] for deviating
from his favorite speed) has his best compromise under the first rule at 69
mph.' The vaguer rule induces Speedy to drive again at 60 mph but slows
McFast to 65 mph,4' thereby concentrating their conducts.
The following figure illustrates the effect of these limits on the distri-
bution of conducts. One limit is subject to more imprecise enforcement
and is lower than one that is more precisely enforced. Both provide for the
same penalty for equal violations. Greater uncertainty makes the distribu-
tion of conducts smoother.





55 60 65 70 75 80
Speed
Figure 4: The above figure compares the distributions of conducts subject to two diffrnt
types of imprecisely enforced limits--the light solid line corresponds to the distribution of conducts
under a lower limit having greater uncertainty and the heavy solid line maps the distribution of con-
ducts under the more precise limit-but with the same penalties. As expected, the increased uncer-
tainty results in more gradual adjustments and a smoother distribution of conducts. Roughly speaking,
function of the upper half of the triangular distribution, as explained above. See supra note 35. One
more mile ofslowing to 59 mph, would further reduce the expected penalty by 1.22. She will give 1.52
to save 1.59, but she will not give 1.68 if that only saves her 1.22.
40. The calculation of McFast's cost of reducing speed does not differ from Speedy's. The sixth
mile of speed reduction reduces his welfare by 0.88 and the seventh by 1.04. Since he accepts certain
enforcement, each mile of speed reduction saves him exactly 1 in penalty. The seventh mile of speed
reduction is not cost-justified.
41. They both choose to reduce speed by 10 miles from their optimal speeds, making the outcome
identical. The 10 mile of slowing hurts them 1.52 and the I le, hurts by 1.68. McFast saves about 1.66
in expected penalty for both the 10 and the 11' mile, so only the 10 ' is cost-justified. Spcedy saves
about 1.53 in expected penalty for the 0' mile. The 1 l4nile takes her to the lower half of the trian-
gular distribution and the formula of the expected penalty changes to (sped-limlt)G(sped)=(59-
45)2(59-45)21(45-75)2. The resulting reduction in expected penalty for the Ili mile of slowing down
(after we subtract the expected penalty for the 11 6 from that of the 10t) is 1A0. She will suffer 1.52 to
save 1.53 ofexpected penalty, but not 1.68 to save 1.40.
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the increased uncertainty brings together the conducts that correspond to the two darkly shaded areas,
by means of the increase in popularity of conducts that corresponds to the lightly shaded area that Is
between them. (The more imprecisely enforced limit is located at 45 mph, and its range of uncertainty
ends at 75 mph; the more precisely enforced limit is located at 55 mph, and its range of uncertainty
ends at 65 mph. The penalty multiplier (r) for both limits is 1. The scaling factor (a) of optimization
functions is 0.08. Preferences are normally distributed with mean 70 and standard deviation 10,
marked by the light dotted line.)
In sum, the inescapable phenomenon of imprecise enforcement makes
precise limits generate a dispersing effect. Not only vaguer limits, but also
increased uncertainty of enforcement, would mitigate this dispersing effect.
The next section deals with one more incidence of precision-induced dis-
persion: rules containing fixed penalties.
B. Fixed Penalties
Penalties or parts of penalties that do not depend on the size of the
violation are fixed penalties. If violations of every severity receive the
same penalty, that results in a pure fixed penalty. Where penalties vary
with the size of the violation but contain a residual penalty that burdens
even the smallest violation, that part of the penalty is its fixed component.
Fixed penalties, pure or partial, are frequently used in many areas,
from minimum and maximum administrative and criminal sanctions, to
minimum court fees in civil litigation to the very structure of negligence
liability.' The effects of fixed penalties are especially important at the
upper range of the penalties. When the individual is subject to the maxi-
42. Negligence liability contains as a fixed component the expected injury that would be caused by
the most careless conduct that is not negligent. More carelessness increases the expected injury and
penalty, but the fixed component remains. Care of $5, say is reasonable, but causes $7 of accidents on
average. Those injured by care of $5 do not have negligence claims and the injurer pays no damages.
A reduction of care to $4 produces $2 of additional expected injuries, increasing expected injuries to
$9. All those injured by care of $4 or less will have negligence claims. The $7 of expected injury that
the injurer pays for violating the negligence limit, regardless by how much he violated It, Is the fixed
component of the negligence penalty.
To formalize, note that the expected injury Ej produced by carelessness t when injury J occurs




If negligence liability is imposed only where the injurer exhibits carelessness t>t*, then for every tl>t*
the expected injury which is also the expected penalty is
t, t. tIEj(ti) = fg(X,)jdX = Jg())jdX + Jg(X)jdX
)=0 1.=0 ,x=t*
This is a penalty with a fixed component, namely the first of the two integrals which does not change
with conduct.
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mum penalty, further violations go undeterred4 The literature on bank-
ruptcy and corporate governance is replete with the distortion of the
debtor's and the equity-holder's incentives at the point of insolvency."
Maximums in criminal and administrative sanctions have the same effect.5
Fixed penalties function like sunk costs. Once a conduct is penalized,
the part of the penalty that does not depend on conduct no longer has a
deterrent effect. This effect is obvious with respect to pure fixed penalties
under which, all violations receive the same sanction, and hence, individu-
als who decide to violate will have no incentive to reduce their conduct or
mitigate their penalty. Adding a variable component (as in tacking $10 for
each mile over the limit after fixing the penalty for speeding at $50) does
not completely remedy this dispersing effect. The deterrence of those who
choose to violate the limit is driven by only the variable part of the penalty,
while the deterrence of those who decide to comply is driven by both fixed
and variable parts.
The dispersion effect of fixed penalties results from the fact that some
individuals do feel the deterrent effect of the fixed penalty. Those whose
preferences exceed the limit only slightly find the compromise of reducing
their conduct to avoid the fixed component of the penalty attractive. The
larger the fixed penalty, the greater the range of preferences that feel the
penalty's deterrent effect and, therefore, the larger the dispersion of con-
ducts. The last individual who complies with the limit has the greatest
deterred preference, while the individual with the preference for the next
greater conduct will be undeterred and follow his preference. Their prefer-
ences hardly differ but their conducts lie far apart.
The dispersing effect of fixed penalties can be illustrated by returning
to the example of Jane Speedy and John McFast. Assume that the precise
limit is 55 mph and the penalty, regardless of the size of the violation, is
$30. Jane will abide by the limit," while John will not only violate it, but
will ignore it and follow the same conduct that he would have if there were
43. Think of the serial killer he has no incentive to stop after he is already subject to the maximum
sentence.
44. Chancellor Allen of the Delaware court of chancery explains how this cffect distorts the settle-
ment incentives of the board of directors of a defendant firm that is close to insolvency; he cures the
distortion by extending the board's fiduciary obligations to include creditors. S.e Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 IL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991); see also
RONALD J. GiLSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FIA.Nm OF CORPORATE ACQutSmo.s
247-50 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing this phenomenon and providing further citations).
45. While wealth differences ensure that the distortions of (civil) incentives due to insolvency fall
at very different points for each individual, administrative and criminal maximums %ill tend to be
similar and, therefore, their effects will be more pronounced.
46. Jane will have to slow down by 15 miles to abide by the limit (from her preference for 70 to 55




no limit 7 Thus, their conducts have come to differ by 20 mph while their
preferences only differ by 5 mph.
Vagueness mitigates this dispersion because the deterrent effect of the
fixed penalty is felt gradually. Suppose that a perfectly precise limit is
substituted by a vague one having the same average position. The ex-
pected penalty inside the vagueness range increases as the fixed penalty
becomes more likely to be imposed. Returning to our illustration, let us
say that Speedy and McFast face a vague "reasonable speed" limit which is
interpreted on average to be 55 :-20 mph and for each mile in the vague-
ness range the likelihood of violation increases by 2.5%.48 Facing the same
fixed penalty of $30, Speedy will choose 65 mph49 and McFast 70 mph. 0
Their conducts differ by exactly as much as their preferences. If the goal
of the limit is to reduce accidents by harmonizing speeds, the vague limit
proves to be more successful." Vagueness effectively converts the fixed
penalty into a variable one, albeit only within the vagueness range.
Moreover, vagueness closes the gap between the last complying individual
and the first violator since conducts at the upper end of the vagueness
range are closer to that of the first violator than in the case of the precise
limit.
Therefore, unless dispersion of conducts is an acknowledged goal of a
rule having fixed penalties, either the fixed penalty must be substituted by
a variable one, or the vagueness of the rule must be increased. This par-
tially restores the original distribution of preferences in society, even if
conducts have been significantly deterred.
C. Procedure
Procedure influences deterrence. It determines the cost and probability
with which an enforceable judgment can be produced. In the setting of
47. To abide by the limit, John would have to slow down by 20 miles (from 75to 55 mph), which
would reduce his welfare by 32 ( -.08*[75-55]2 ). This is too large a cost to justify saving the $30
penalty. Once he decides to violate, he returns to his preference for 75 mph.
48. This corresponds to a uniformly distributed limit. Since the penalty is fixed, the actual realiza-
tion of the limit does not matter. For a driver who chooses to drive at 65 mph, it makes no difference
whether the realization of the limit is at 52 mph or 62 mph. There is no need, therefore, to calculate the
average position of the limit on the condition that it being below the conduct.
49. To calculate Speedy's optimal speed, consider that she loses 0.16"(70 - speed) of utility for
each mile she slows down, as was discussed above. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Thus,
her fifth mile of slowing down reduces her utility by 0.16*4.5=.72 (again using the middle of the 51
mile, 4.5, to get its impact). Each mile of slowing down within the vagueness range of 55120 mph
reduces the probability of the conduct being a violation by 2.5%. Given the $30 fixed penalty, this
reduces the expected penalty by 750. Thus, Speedy's fifth mile of slowing down is cost-justified. The
sixth would reduce utility by 0.16*5.5=.88 and not be worth the 750 reduction in expected penalty.
50. McFast's fifth and sixth miles of speed reduction reduce his welfare by the same 720 and 880,
respectively that similarly hurt Speedy. Facing the same penalties, he makes the same compromise.
51. The average speed of both drivers under the vague rule is 67.5 mph (65 + 70/2), while average
speed under the precise rule is 65 mph. Where the 2.5 miles average speed increase that the vague limit
causes should be a problem, its deterrence can be increased by a small increase of the penalty.
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civil litigation, distortions of the incentives produced by the flaws of civil
procedure have received much attention.52 Fee-shifting provisions and
arbitration are results of concerns about the cost of civil litigation and the
potential for nuisance suits. Criminal procedure is somewhat different.
The prosecution fights an uphill battle that is designed to avoid penalizing
the innocent and to prevent abuse of power. The defense wins by default if
guilt is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By the same token, a civil
plaintiff wins only if she meets the burden of proving her case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
Criminal trials are biased in the defendant's favor. The uneven burden
of proof is only one of the many of the prosecution's handicaps. A single
mistake by the police can make important evidence against the defendant
inadmissible as per the "exclusionary rule.""3 In contrast to the defendant's
right to raise a series of often repetitive appeals, the prosecution's right to
an appeal is much more limited. This type of bias can be analyzed by styl-
izing it into a single-win-acquits trial for the defendant: any single win by
the defendant in any of the prosecution's hurdles and he avoids a guilty
verdict. If the defendant faces a trial with several relevant hurdles, the
odds of losing the trial are much lower than the odds of losing each hurdle.
Four hurdles in which the defendant loses with an 85% probability each
make for a 52% probability of conviction (0.854= 0.52).
There are generally two distinct types of hurdles that the prosecution
must overcome: hurdles that depend on the defendant's conduct and hur-
dles that present identical odds regardless of the defendant's conduct. A
hurdle depends on conduct if the prosecution's odds of surmounting it de-
pend on the severity of the defendant's violation. Because the object of
this analysis is to study how procedure influences deterrence, hurdles that
do not depend on conduct are irrelevant and can be disregarded.55
An explicit hurdle provides a familiar example. In most criminal
cases, the prosecution must persuade every juror beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt. If, on the lie of the evidence, persuading
any one juror is expected with 90% probability, the odds of persuading all
52. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, II J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). For a newer spin on the
debate, see John . Donohue II, Optingfor the British Rule, or If Posner and ShMaell Can't Remember
the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
53. See Bany F. Shanks, Comment, Comparatve Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alter-
natives, 57 TuL. L. REV. 648 (1983) (surveying the exclusionary rule).
54. Civil trials have a similar bias as will be discussed later. See infra note 59 and accompanying
text
55. If conduct-independent hurdles reduce deterrence too much they can be addressed by increasing
penalties, akin to the Up adjustment. Since the expected penalty for all conducts is reduced by these
hurdles, all penalties should increase.
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12 are 28% (.912).56 The structure of criminal trials may hide other hurdle-
like features. To the extent that guilt beyond reasonable doubt depends on
the clear memory of witnesses and on the pristine state of physical evi-
dence, any defendant who wins an appeal directing a retrial may nearly be
out of the woods: time fades memories and adds to the possibility of acci-
dents and mishandling of the physical evidence. Even legal instruction
seems geared toward the ability to identify such issues in hypotheticals
that, in turn, translates into an ability to raise or anticipate hurdles.
The features of hurdles may vary from trial to trial but the conclusions
remain consistent with the one-win-acquits analysis. It is accurate to ana-
lyze this hurdle-like feature of criminal trials as a series of random rolls-
casts of a die-in which the defendant need only win some, perhaps more
than one, of the rolls. Moreover, not all issues in a criminal trial have
identical importance. Some types of issues may allow a single win by the
defendant to acquit, while other types may only marginally increase the
chances of an acquittal. Of course, this analysis applies only to the poten-
tially important issues. Similarly ignored are hurdles that are made irrele-
vant by their position.57 There is also no reason to expect that the number
of such hurdles is constant in trials. It is likely to be a function of the
available time of trial lawyers that in turn translates into a function of the
defendant's wealth that can be transferred to lawyers (thus, notoriety may
be a substitute for monetary wealth), to the funding of legal aid lawyers,
and to other determinants of trial time, as, for example, the trial calendar
and docket load.58
Suppose, for example, that the prosecution must overcome 12 such
hurdles to convict, whether these hurdles are important issues or appeals or
jurors. The defendant's conduct influences the odds of losing each of these
hurdles (remember that hurdles independent of conduct are irrelevant for
56. This calculation assumes that each juror's beliefs (or the odds in each trial stage or hurdle) are
independent of the others'. Although independence may be an excessive assumption, perfect correla-
tion is definitely not the case. If the outcomes of all hurdles were perfectly correlated they would be
redundant By contrast, lawyers' ability to raise several issues even after they have lost one, clearly
increases the probability of the defendant's acquittal. The expansion of this model to account for
correlation between 0 and 1 among the different hurdles would confuse, rather than illuminate this
model and is, therefore, left for the reader to grapple with.
57. Suppose that one hurdle is overcome with certainty when conduct exceeds 29, while others
have a range of uncertainty from 30 to 40. The former will not influence conduct because it Is domi-
nated by the latter (in the sense that all conducts of 30 result in acquittals). Although this analysis
imposes identical location of all hurdles, small variations will not change the conclusions. Large varia-
tions will cause some hurdles to be dominated and will effectively reduce the number of relevant hur-
dles.
58. Other complexities that actual trials would present do not detract from this generalization. If,
for example, the last juror tends to be persuaded by the rest, then it would be more appropriate to think
ofjuries with 12 members as having the effect of 11 hurdles. If any win by the prosecution allows the
defendant to appeal and increases the possibility of acquittal, the number of hurdles increases. A per-
fect match is impossible when trying to form a simplified abstraction to analyze a complicated and
unpredictable system of events such as a criminal trial.
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deterrence). Examples of such conduct may be the form of the crime (hei-
nous crimes may lead to easier convictions) or the defendant's rummaging
at the crime scene, which may tend to create more incriminating evidence.
Applying the above analysis to a hypothetical shows the effect of hur-
dles. Suppose that the defendant avoids guilt if he wins any one of the
twelve hurdles and that his conduct (simple crime with and without rum-
maging or heinous crime with and without rummaging) influences the odds
of a guilty verdict in all twelve the same way, from 85% for the simple
crime without rummaging to 90% for either the heinous without or the
simple crime with rummaging and up to 95% for the heinous with rum-
maging. Although the likelihood of the penalty increases as the violation
becomes greater, this type of uncertainty differs from that in imprecise
enforcement. The fact that the prosecution must overcome all hurdles
compounds the effect of this uncertainty. Thus, where each hurdle may be
overcome by the prosecution with 90% probability, this compounding
means that the odds of overcoming all twelve are 28% (.912).
The odds of losing a hurdle-like trial are minimal unless losing each is
nearly certain. Raising the per hurdle odds exponentially to the number of
hurdles produces credible probabilities of conviction only if the conduct
has approached the end of the range of uncertainty, where losing all hur-
dles becomes certain. From the conduct that reaches certain conviction and
on, the expected penalty increases with the slower rate of the nominal pen-
alty. This by now familiar increase of the penalty at a decreasing rate, pro-
duces dispersion of conducts. Varying the number of wins required to ac-
quit moves the location of the dispersing effect inside the range of uncer-
tainty with little mitigation of the dispersing effect. The following figure
illustrates this by plotting the expected penalties under a 12-hurdles-l-win-
acquits scenario and a 12-hurdles-6-wins-acquit one.59 The difference in
the 6-wins-acquit environment, which can be considered akin to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, is a rapid rise of the expected penalty
at about the mid-point of the range of uncertainty instead of the rise at its
upper end that is associated with the one-win-acquits environment.
59. The expected penalty is transformed from the 1-hurdle form it took in imprecise enforcement to
the compounded form: En(t)=M(t)p n(t, tW, where M(t) in the cumulative density function of the limit,
i.e., the probability of losing each hurdle, h is the number of hurdles and n(t, ta__ is the penalty as a
function of conduct t and the nominal limit tah. If the trial were not biased in favor of the defendant,
then it might be proper to consider that the plaintiffwould have to win only more than half the hurdles
(a simple majority, for example, in the jury may be enough) for an acquittal. Then the answer is to
model the probability that the defendant will lose half, not all, the hurdles, given by CDF(BIN(h, I-
M(t)), h2), where h is the number of hurdles, M(t) is the cumulative probability of losing any hurdle
giwen conduct t, and CDF(BIN(.)) is the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution.
The expected penalty becomes En(t)=CDF(BIN(h, l-M(t)), hf2)n(t, t.0,) but its properties remain very
similar to those of the expected penalty of the l-win-acquits trial.
2000]
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Figure 5: This is an illustration of the effect of hurdles that depend on conduct and which
the prosecution (1-win-acquits; heavy solid line) or the civil plaintiff (6-wins-acquit; light solid line)
must overcome to reach victory at trial. The expected penalty makes a quick run-up to revert to the
nominal penalty at that proportion of the vagueness range which corresponds roughly to the fraction of
victories that determine the trial's outcome. (The interesting practical implication is that more proce-
dure only favors the defendant if his conduct in the vagueness range lies beyond the fraction of wins
required to convict; compare a conduct two-thirds into the vagueness range under these two trials.)
The expected penalty with 1 hurdle is identical to that of imprecise enforcement The uncertainty
follows the triangular distribution, see supra note 35, from t, to t, and the penalty multiplier (r) Is
I.
Both the degree of uncertainty, as well as the number of hurdles, influence
the shape of the expected penalty and its dispersing effect. We shall, next,
examine changes in these two dimensions of procedure.
In order to study deterrence as uncertainty changes, we need a con-
stant point around which uncertainty will increase. As in the case of im-
precise enforcement, where the limit stays constant, increases in uncer-
tainty would reduce deterrence."° As we discovered when comparing lim-
its of different vagueness (where we held the mid-point of the limits con-
stant as we changed vagueness), the fixed point for the comparison of
criminal trials of differing uncertainty is the point where the brunt of the
deterrence would be felt:6 the weighted average of the conduct where a
60. That is, if our speeding drivers were to believe that greater violations would lead to the same
expected penalty, they would drive faster.
61. We need a point inside the ranges of uncertainty that we can keep constant as we change un-
certainty, so that we are able to see how changes of uncertainty pivot around a point that can serve as
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guilty verdict is reached.62 The following figure plots the expected penalty
using two different levels of uncertainty. The familiar smoothing of the
transitions that more uncertainty causes is apparent.
the intuitive anchor for the comparison. In the case of the vague limit, the selection of such a point was
easy-we just kept the midpoint of the limit constant and varied vagueness around it from, say, a 6: 2
mph limit to a 65:40 or-+20 mph limit. Here, we cannot do this because the one-win-acquits trial
produces uncertainty that is not conveniently located at the center of the range of uncertainty, but near
the end corresponding to more egregious conduct.
62. Formally, that is the weighted average of the resulting distribution of the limit. Calling the
probability density function of the limit m(t), the weighted average conviction conduct t., of the 12-
hurdle 1-win-acquits trial will be














Figure 6: The above figure illustrates the expected penalty (top), the rate of change of the
penalty (middle) and how increasingly or decreasingly increasing the penalty is (bottom) under two
different ranges of uncertainty in a 12-hurdle 1-win-acquits trial. Notice how the expanded uncer-
tainty translates into smoother transitions. The broad range of uncertainty in the more uncertain trial
allows the marginal penalty to decline softly until it reaches the constancy of the certain penalty at
t.,. The much narrower range where this change must take place in the case of precision produces a
much faster diminishing rate of change of the penalty. Uncertainty follows the triangular distribution,
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The number of hurdles also influences how gradual deterrence is. Re-
ducing the number of hurdles reduces directly the compounding of the
odds of guilt. This compounding is accountable for how suddenly the odds
of conviction change (from near-nil to certain). Changes in the structure of
the criminal trial that would reduce the number of hurdles involve, for ex-
ample, either a reduction in the number of jurors or a reduction in the pro-
cedural means offered to the defendant in challenging the prosecution, such
as the elimination of interlocutory appeals. The recent legislation that re-
duced the number of death-row habeas corpus appeals at the Federal
Courts63 had precisely this effect. Finally, the number of procedural safe-
guards given to criminal defendants varies not only by jurisdiction and
court, but even by judge.
The following figure illustrates the effect that a change in the number
of hurdles has on the expected penalty. The greater the number of hurdles
that the prosecution must overcome, the steeper the rise of the expected
penalty and the less are small infractions of the limit deterred. The sudden
increase, however, also implies a rapid reduction of its rate of increase
when the penalty reverts to the rate of change of the nominal penalty and,
therefore, a strong dispersion of conducts. A reduction in the number of
hurdles brings a more gradual increase of the penalty and less dispersion of
conducts.
63. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, and adding 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1994 & Supp. 11996)).
64. Admittedly, however, the deterrent effect of that particular procedural tool may be dubious.
How does the anticipation of a fractional diminution of the odds of eecution in favor of life Imprison-
ment influence the deterrent effect of the murder limit? See eg, Ehrlich & Zhiqlang Liu, Sensithiily
Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let's Keep the Econ In Econometrics, 42 J.L & ECON. 455
(1999) (discussing the deterrent effect of the murder limit). But see John . Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs In the Battle Against Cre, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1998) (providing a different approach by arguing that education Is more cost-
justified than harsher penalties).
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Figure 7: This comparison of trials subject to different numbers of hurdles (with constant
uncertainty) shows how more hurdles make the deterrence come later in the range of uncertainty. The
more the hurdles, the lower the nominal limit must be for the weighted average conduct of conviction
to stay constant at t.. More hurdles imply larger maximum marginal penalties, faster declines there-
after and more intense dispersing effects. Hurdles range from 3 (heavy line) to 9 (dashing line) to 27
(light line). Uncertainty follows the triangular distribution, see supra note 35, and the penalty multi-
plier (r) is 1.
It should not be surprising that reducing the number of hurdles has an
effect similar to increasing uncertainty. Although more hurdles may give
the deceptive appearance of greater uncertainty, they create precision. The
odds of conviction change from extremely unlikely to practically certain
over a narrower range of conducts, which is an attribute of precision.
V. CONCLUSION
That precision leads to dispersion of some conducts should not detract
from the more fundamental point: precise limits concentrate conducts;
vague limits can restore their original distribution. Precise limits must be
justified by having as a goal the concentration of conducts. Limits that
only aim to reduce or to increase conducts must be vague.65 This is as fun-
65. Limits must be vague, that is, provided that the same goals of desired conducts cannot be
achieved by taxes or subsidies. Taxes or subsidies would have general effects on conduct that do not
pivot around a limit. Some taxes, of course, are triggered by the breach of a limit, and their effects on
conduct should be analyzed as those of limits.
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damental a concept as that which holds that rules must be justified by hav-
ing a goal of influencing conducts. The thoughtless use of precise limits
distorts the distributions of conducts with consequences that we cannot
estimate or even guess.
Vagueness replaces the abrupt changes in deterrence that precise limits
produce by gradually varying incentives to adjust conduct. The goals that
precise limits may have in changing levels of conduct can be achieved just
as well with vague limits. The customized compliance that vague limits
produce also simulates a trade between individuals who desire more of the
conduct with those who require less. Moreover, the distribution of con-
ducts that a limit produces is often of paramount importance to the social
planner. Vagueness is the variable that determines distributions of con-
duct.
The analysis of the deterrent effect of precise and imprecise limits can
be effectively used to study other expressions of precision in the legal sys-
tem. Precision often disperses some conducts. In order to make an in-
formed choice about a limit's precision, we must take this dispersing effect
into account. When is society better off if some conducts are far apart?
Perhaps the dispersing effects of our elaborate trial procedures appropri-
ately separate the violent from the peaceful. If, on the other hand, the seg-
regated violators are unified by social characteristics (gender, race, or sex-
ual orientation, for example) dispersion may hamper their social integration
by producing feelings of alienation and deprive society of these marginal-
ized groups' contribution. By lessening procedure, society might embrace
these groups before they are led to crime.
Paradoxically almost, the study of uncertainty led to a realization of the
conflict between larger penalties and more procedure. Political factions
have formed around these objectives. The advocates of "order" seek
higher penalties. The advocates of "fairness" promote the preservation of
defendants' procedural protections. A political environment that ignores
that the two positions produce the opposite effects on deterrence, will na-
ively satisfy both. Penalties will grow and procedural steps will multiply,
which seems a fitting description of our criminal system, if not of our en-
tire judicial system. Perhaps we are ready to consider the issue of optimal
procedure in conjunction with uncertainty and penalty sizes. Too little
procedure presents large chances of errors but smooth distributions of con-
ducts. Too much procedure may polarize conducts and correlate deter-
rence with wealth--that also translates into lawyer time to add procedural
hurdles-and judicial attitudes-because small personal biases, com-
pounded by the numerous hurdles, may result in significantly different
expected penalties. The rationing of procedure is not new for the legal
system, which uses several different procedural "tracks," from small claims
courts to full-fledged federal trials. It is clearly an issue that begs the at-
tention of economic analysis of law.
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